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KNOWLEDGE AND UNITY IN HERACLITUS
In this paper I argue that the logos, the primary object of knowledge in Heraclitus' epistemology, is a unity both as an object of knowledge and as an instance of being rather than becoming. Section I begins with discussions of knowledge and Heraclitus' conception of logos', section II is concerned with knowledge and unity. The two later sections of the paper explore the consequences of the account I attribute to Heraclitus: section III considers being, unity, and change; and section IV discusses Heraclitus' views of knowledge and sense perception.
I. Knowledge and Logos
Several recent studies of Heraclitus have investigated his epistemological terms and strategies;1 here, my object is to explore the re quirements that Heraclitus places on the object of knowledge. In his fre quent rebukes to his rivals, Heraclitus indicates that the mere accumulation of information is not knowledge. For instance, in fr. 40 he chides Pythagoras, Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus: they have much learning (polymathi?) but no understanding (noos); in fr. 129 Pythagoras is further accused of kakotechnia (malpractice).2 An important clue to the condemna tion of polymathy appears within fr. 40 itself: the polymaths fail to under stand what they think they know. This is echoed in frs. 1 and 34: people prove forever uncomprehending (axunetoi) of the account (logos) which holds forever that Heraclitus gives (fr. I);3 uncomprehending (axunetoi), hearing as the deaf do, they are "absent while present" (fr. 34). In the presence of the truth they simply do not comprehend.4 Knowledge is not the mere collection of material even if the beliefs so held are true. Rather, it re quires the understanding of that material; and so a certain kind of insight separates the polymaths of fr. 40 from the true lovers of wisdom who in quire into many things in fr. 35. The contrast between these two fragments raises the question of how Heraclitus conceives of knowledge and its object. The concept of logos in Heraclitus (particularly as it appears in frs. 1, 2, and 50) is both central and controversial. There is little agreement among commentators about the nature, status, or even the larger role of the logos within Heraclitus' system. Some see it as an independent force that guides the universe while others view logos only as a shorthand reference to Heraclitus* own words.8 Neither of these extreme views is, I think, correct.
The word logos appears in contexts that refer to Heraclitus' own theory in frs. 1, 2, and 50, and in a reference to competing theories in 108:9
Although this account (logos) holds forever, people forever prove uncom prehending, both before hearing it and once they have heard. For although all things come to be in accordance with this account (logos), people are like the unexperienced when they experience such words and deeds as I set forth, distinguishing each according to its nature and saying how it is (kata phusin diaire?n hekaston kai phraz?n hok?s eche? Marcovich' s claim that the logos might be conceived as corporeal, and then asserts that Kirk reifies the logos in suggesting that it might be "something independent."16 Barnes refers to Guthrie, H?lscher, and Mar covich, but gives no exact account of the position he rejects; he says only that "most scholars have found in logos a technical term, and they have striven to discover a metaphysical sense for it."17 The assumption seems to be that in frs. 1, 2, 50 and 108 either logos refers to a mysterious (and vague) independent metaphysical force or it is merely a reference to Heraclitus' discourse. But there is a third, more plausible, alternative.
Heraclitus' assertion that the logos is common (xunon) (fr. 2) and his pronouncement that all things come to be in accordance with the logos (ginomen?n . . . pant?n kata ton logon) (fr. 1) suggest that he has more in mind than simply the words of his book or the verbal content of his ut terances. The logos also encompasses the truth given in his utterances, and this is a truth that is objective and independent of anyone's having thought or heard it. "/ogos-textured" account of the world. This is illustrated in the attack on Hesiod (fr. 57),29 and the claims about the road (fr. 60) and the carding wheel (fr. 59).30 But even as Heraclitus challenges this aspect of a naive metaphysics of things he maintains its epistemological assumptions. In sisting on the unity of the opposites and on the changes between opposites that occur in sensible objects, Heraclitus nevertheless also maintains the necessity of unity in the object of knowledge.31
The attacks on the polymaths in fr. 40 and on Hesiod in 57 indicate that understanding and comprehension are the fundamental epistemic con cepts for Heraclitus. Moreover, these fragments suggest that unity has a double role to play in Heraclitus' theory. Suppose that the polymath has a true belief. Why then should Heraclitus quarrel with him? First, in fr. 40 the term 'polymath' suggests a lack of system in the sheer accumulation of true beliefs. The polymaths' beliefs are not integrated into a systematic and ex planatory whole, the understanding of which constitutes knowledge. The polymath may well hold a true belief without understanding why that belief is, as a matter of fact, true; for the justification that Heraclitus seems to de mand, seeing that and how the single belief is part of a system that is a unified whole, is missing here. Such knowledge will ultimately be knowledge of the logos, for the logos is the deeper truth of the systematic connectedness of things in the world. To see the connection is to understand why the belief is true; to exhibit that connection is to justify and to explain. Second, fr. 57 indicates that Hesiod does not truly know day and night, because he fails to know that they are one. Heraclitus does not deny that Hesiod knows many things, but the fragment questions the extent and depth of that knowledge.32 True knowledge implies knowing the whole of each thing, that is, knowing it as a complete unity, so that no part of it is left out. Hesiod knows that day and night are opposites and so apparently do not in habit their house at the same time; but Hesiod's knowledge is incomplete, for he fails to know that there is actually a unity that underlies and thus con nects the opposites. Each knowable can and must be known completely in itself as a unified whole. Simply knowing more things is not to have more knowledge; instead, Heraclitus insists that real knowledge is knowing in a different, deeper way. Thus, Hesiod fails to grasp the whole of day and night and so fails to understand and to know properly.33 This, too, is a failure to grasp the logos, for its subject is the truth about the way things are. Logos is both the account of how things are and Heraclitus' shorthand way of referring to the actual facts of the matter that the logos expresses. If to name is to gesture towards the thing named, and to know or to understand is to grasp and to appropriate the thing known for oneself, then, for this process to proceed smoothly, for knowing to be successful, what is grasped must be both cohesive and complete. One grasps a whole, not just a collection or multiplicity of aspects; so for this reason as well the object of knowledge by strong acquaintance must be a unity. (Compare gripping a tennis ball with attempting to hold onto a handful of mercury.)34 The re quirement here is that the object of knowledge must be unified; not that there is only one object of knowledge possible.35 Each thing that is known is a complete and stable whole, to be grasped and held by the mind or psuch?.
A divided or pluralistic object is inconstant and unstable; it shifts between its various aspects and cannot be held in the appropriate way. An object of knowledge then, must be constant in the way that the Greek tradition con ceived of being as both stable and uniform.
///. Being, Unity, and Change
In fr. 1 Heraclitus declares that he "distinguishes each thing according to its nature, saying how it is." His logos then is this account; one who has grasped it will have understanding or xunesis of how things really are. Frag ment 2 adds that this logos is common (xunos) but that "the many live as though having a private understanding."
The truth that can be com prehended (the content of the logos) is both independent of an individual knower (for it is not idion) and publicly available (for it is xunon).36 Failing to recognize the common character of the logos is a grave mistake, for Heraclitus* claim is that private understanding is not real understanding at all.37 This is supported by fr. 89: for those who are awake there is a com mon universe which can be grasped and understood, but sleepers turn away into a private universe.38 The necessity of paying attention to the common is stressed further in fr. 114:
Those speaking with insight must hold firmly to that which is common to all, just as a city does to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by one, the divine <law>; for it rules as far as it wishes, and is enough for all, and still remains.
Here the message that the logos is common to all is repeated from fr. 2, and something more is added.39 A city may enact particular laws; but these are dependent upon the single divine law which gives them their legitimacy. In the same way, one who desires to have insight or understanding (noos) must ground this understanding in the common, identified by fr. 2 as the logos, because it is both the epistemological basis for explaining the various phenomena of the physical world and a link to the foundation of the together demonstrate that only such knowledge is wisdom or xunesis. None of the competing accounts (logoi) have gone so far as to see the complete separateness of the one thing that is wise: this is the true logos that only Heraclitus has uttered. That such wisdom can indeed be gained, because the independent, unchanging logos is there for the grasping, only adds to Heraclitus' contempt for those polymaths such as Pythagoras and Hesiod who might have heard and understood the independent logos but did not.
Heraclitus must then conceive of the logos as something independent of the phenomena it describes, something the knowledge of which is not identical with the beliefs we have about the sensory world. Moreover, in order to be a proper object of knowledge, this logos is both a unity and an instance of be ing.
Although it is clear that Heraclitus draws a distinction between being and becoming and relies on it, his is not yet a 'two world' metaphysics. But given his epistemologica! claims, there must be a double aspect to the world. Heraclitus presumes that the object of knowlege is something real, unified, and apart; this assumption is itself a part of a metaphysics of things. Yet the being-becoming distinction is given a characteristically Heraclitean twist, because the truth about the world that the logos presents is that change is constant and such change entails plurality. This appears in fr. 10: "Grasp ings: wholes and not wholes, convergent divergent, consonant dissonant, from all things one and from one thing all."44 'Graspings' here refers both to the action of the mind in reaching out to understand the logos and to the unified object which is grasped, as well as to the unified entities in the world about which that truth tells. The truth that is grasped asserts that the elements of the sensible world together are a diversity that can be and are unified, and that each object in the world is itself both a converging unity and a diverging plurality.45 'Consonant' and 'dissonant' suggest the rela tions of the opposites; in fr. doctrine of radical flux. Fragment 80 asserts that "it is necessary to know that war is common (xunon), and justice strife, and all things come to be through strife and necessity;"48 and while this implies that strife is a necessary component of the world, it should not suggest that strife is the main focus of Heraclitus' theory.49 Heraclitus also emphasizes the harmony of the elements of the world and notes that the relation between strife and harmony will be misconstrued: "they do not comprehend (xuniasin) how differing it agrees with itself; there is a back-turning (palintropos) connec tion (harmonie) as in the bow and the lyre" (fr. 51).50 Here, there is a ten sion and pulling apart generated by strife or war, but that tension produces the harmonious arrangement or collecting that just is the bow or the lyre.
Differing, it agrees, and the result is a connection or accord. Strife is a con cealed but necessary part of the overall pattern: "The hidden connection (harmonie aphan?s) is better than the obvious (phaner?s) one" (fr. 54). The reality of strife is obvious, but Heraclitus warns that the obvious is not the whole truth: "nature (phusis) loves to hide" (125); "unless he hopes for the unhoped for, he will not discover it, for it is not to be found out, and it is trackless" (18). The point is that it is difficult to find the true nature of things given in the logos. Unless one expects such difficulty one cannot hope to understand, for the obvious is unlikely to be the whole truth. Aporon It has been suggested that Heraclitus repudiates claims to perceptual knowledge because perception is essentially private.54 I do not think that this interpretation will stand. Heraclitus denies that sense perception is the sole means to knowledge; certainly the import of fr. 107 is that the language of sense perception cannot be understood by one whose soul is barbarian or incapable of understanding it.55 If the language of sense perception were transparent and immediately understandable, there would be no barbarian souls and no problem of perception.56 So, Heraclitus' concerns suggest that information provided by the senses is not transparent in the appropriate way: the barbarian soul fails to possess or understand the proper canons of translation and interpretation for the data supplied by the senses. Such a soul is like the polymaths of fr. 40: it has information but no understand ing. But this is not a problem of privacy. The possibility that persons might not perceive in the same way does not enter Heraclitus' arguments.57 The reasons why sense perception cannot be the sole source of knowledge are given in frs. 1, 123, and 108. Fragment 1 says that Heraclitus will distinguish each thing according to its phusis saying how each thing is (phraz?n hok?s eche?). This is specifically linked to the logos that holds forever and in accordance with which things come to pass. Fragment 123 asserts tht phusis loves to hide, while fr. 108 specifically claims that the wise is something set apart from all. The fragments together indicate that logos cannot be grasped or understood by the senses alone. The real nature that is hidden is not available to sense perception: a part may be revealed through the senses, but the unified whole of a thing, its real phusis, is not. Fragment 10 insists that taking a part for the whole is a mistake.
What, then, is the proper role of perception in knowledge? A hint is given in fr. 93: "the lord whose oracle is at Delphi, neither speaks nor con ceals, but gives a sign" (pute legei oute kruptei alla s?mainei). This is often taken as reference either to Heraclitus' own cryptic and enigmatic style, or to the logos itself. A more plausible view is that it refers to both.58 But the fragment also illustrates the role of sense perception in knowledge. The truth about things is neither utterly concealed from nor entirely revealed to sense experience; rather, the perceptible world is a series of signs about the way things really are. Taking a sign for the whole truth is a mistake; but so is refusing to read a signal. Moreover, the analogy with the Delphic oracle is significant. In addition to insight one also needs some understanding of Apollo himself, of the Pythia, and of the translations and interpretations of past signs in order to begin to decipher correctly.59 The point here is that as sense experience reveals more to the discerning soul, the soul will better comprehend further sense experience. But this does not explain how the soul actually learns the language and thus ceases to be barbarian. I do not see evidence in the fragments that Heraclitus confronted this problem directly. But fr. 107 asserts that true knowledge, whatever its particular source, must be firmly grounded in the logos. What, then, is to be made of frs. 55 and 101a? The latter does not, of course, give any absolute epistemic preference to sense perception. I agree with Marcovich's reading: it is better to come to a direct understanding of things oneself rather than relying on second-hand teaching, authority, or hearsay. Thus the fragment is not a direct comment on the proper role of sense-perception.60 Although in fr. 55 Heraclitus says that he prefers things of sight, hearing, and experience he does not (as Marcovich pointed out) tell us to what these things are pre ferred. Nor does he tell us why they are preferable. Fragment 55 is thus another passage that favors histori? over polymathi?, expanding the attack on hearsay made in 101a. Genuine histori? is to be preferred because it can lead to a synthesizing of experiences; here it is contrasted with the collection of discrete bits of information that is not harmonized into a network of beliefs. In real understanding there is such a network that gets its epistemic structure from underlying principles articulated by the logos. The poly maths of fr. 40 suffer from a failure of connection. Math?sis is only the first step; Heraclitus' linking of math?sis with sight and hearing in fr. 55 in dicates that the experiences are connected and integrated into a unified whole. The soul in question is not barbarian. Moreover, fr. 55 affirms that knowledge is not limited to grasping the logos; but the senses can give real understanding only insofar as the evidence thus acquired is integrated into the account contained in the logos.
Knowledge of the logos cannot be grounded in sense-experience (despite the endorsement of perception in frs. 55 and 101a). It may be a psychological fact that much knowledge is gained through perception, but Heraclitus stresses that its epistemological grounding is in the logos. Moreover, knowing the logos is crucial because it turns out to be necessary for knowledge of the sensible world. So, for Heraclitus, gn?sis or xunesis of the world of becoming outside of ourselves must ultimately be grounded in a grasping of the logos, in knowledge of that which is.
There remains the question of the relation between the unified object of knowledge and the pluralistic, changing world of sense perception. It is clear that Heraclitus sees the phenomenal world as subject to change, although the changes are regular and regulated rather than capricious and uncontrolled because they are governed by the principle articulated in the logos. But the logos is one and unchanging while the phenomenal world is both many and subject to change; there is, then, a discontinuity between the two which must be overcome. Heraclitus' account of the role of perception in knowledge implies that some of the truth about the logos is obtainable through the senses. Thus, there must be some manifestation of the truth contained in the logos in the sensible world. There is evidence of this in fr. 67: "The god is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger; it changes as, whenever mixed with spices, it is named according to the pleasure of each."61 The perennial puzzle faced by any theory that depends on an unchanging truth or principle to explain the changing world of the senses is how the unity of that which is can be manifested in the pluralistic world of becoming. Heraclitus here provides two interconnected illustra tions (or signs) of how this is possible. First, one and the same thing (the god) can be manifested in the opposites day and night, summer and winter, war and peace, satiety and hunger, because this one thing is all of those op posites (compare the unity of day and night in fr. 57).62 Second, this unified principle can appear and be named in many processes although it remains the same throughout. It is important to note that in fr. 67 Heraclitus does not conceive of ho theos as a substratum that alters; rather each set of op posites and each new process just is ho theos under yet another description.63 Thus sense perception, in providing information about its ob jects, grasps wholes and not wholes, consonances and dissonances, and so on (fr. 10). It might inform us of the whole of its particular object but in sofar as that object is a manifestation of the one fundamental being (which can appear in other guises) it reveals only a part. The same is true of that in tellectual grasping of the logos which is understanding. Unless this also in cludes understanding of logos9 manifestation in the sensible world, it is on ly partial understanding.64 The god that is all of these things is one whole and complete being; as such it is the proper object of knowledge. As the physical manifestations of this being it is becoming and the object of sense perception. In this way, Heraclitus suggests a way across the gap between being and becoming: just as there is unity in the sensible opposites up/down, summer/winter, war/peace, etc., so the logos encompasses both being and becoming. As the principle that explains, it is being; as the manifestations of the content of that principle, it is becoming and change; (recommended in fr. 35) with a less active borrowing implied in an acquisitive sense of manthanein; Pythagoras is thus scolded because he simply takes over other peo ple's views without actually inquiring himself. But this will not do. One acquires knowledge in many ways, and inquiring can be just as acquisitive as learning.
3. The deliberate ambiguity of the first line of fr. 1 was noted by Aristotle; it seems clear that Heraclitus intends to say both that the account holds forever and 7. See Nussbaum (pp. 3-5) and Lesher (pp. 167-69) on this. 8. This is the position taken by Barnes, and it is shared by M. L. West in Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), and probably by Mackenzie. Certainly Mackenzie does not wish to reify the logos and she approvingly quotes Barnes and acknowledges West; but in speaking of it as an object of knowledge she seems to move closer to a middle position.
9. This does not mean, of course, that the other fragments in which the term ap pears fail to be philosophically important; rather, in those fragments logos can more naturally be given an ordinary reading. See Mackenzie, p. 31, n47.
10. West, p. 124. I assume that West would include fragments 50 and 108 in his claims as well. For a discussion of the etymology of logos (a discussion that under mines West's claims) see C. H. Kahn, "A New Look at Heraclitus," American canvassing fifth-century notions of logos and not arguing for an interpretation.) 18. We can distinguish three possibilities here: (a) the logos is simply Heraclitus' discourse; (b) the logos is a set of propositions that are true independently of Heraclitus' utterance of them; (c) the logos is an extra-linguistic truth expressed by the propositions in (b). Because Heraclitus himself does not explicitly mark a distinc tion between propositions and the content that they express his claims slide between (b) and (c).
19. West reads fr. 114 "one must follow the common" as "one must take one's stand on universal principles" (p. 118). This is at odds with West's other claims about logos.
20. Kahn, the recent commentator who is most alive to the complexity of Heraclitus' language, recognizes the logos as "not merely [Heraclitus' ] statement: it is the eternal structure of the world as it manifests itself in discourse" (A , p. 94). 21. The problem extends beyond the fool's inability to discriminate among the logoi he hears: fr. 19 asserts, "not knowing how to listen, neither are they able to 26. The insistence of West and Barnes that logos has no metaphysical force in Heraclitus has led them to overestimate the separation possible between an utterance and its content or its meaning, and the truth specified by that content or meaning.
27. The proper interpretation of to sophon is a difficult issue. Kahn takes to sophon as the content of the competing logoi (including Heraclitus' own). Marcovich (1967) (agreeing with Gigon) takes it theologically, referring to the being named in fr. 32; and this seems to be Robinson's view as well. If the use is theological, I think that it is so only in the broad sense of applying divine predicates to the content of the logos.
28. Mourelatos argues that the naive metaphysics relies on a notion of being in which "there is ultimately only one use of 'is', the one that makes direct contact with reality.... Neither fully a predicative copula nor a marker of identity, this 'is' might be called the 'is' of introduction and recognition, since it has its paradigm . Nor is Mackenzie's related claim that the awareness of the 'opposition of uni ty' is something gained through the private view convincing. 37. Heraclitus must equate a private understanding with "understanding that which is not common." On the face of it, this is a mistake; surely one could have a private understanding of something common. Heraclitus seems simply to have con flated 'private understanding' with 'understanding the private'.
38. It has been widely noted that the use of koinos rather than xunos indicates that 89 is a paraphrase and not a quotation; Marcovich (1967) , however, accepts it as genuine. As Kahn, Robinson, and Mackenzie note, whether or not the wording is genuine, there is no reason to think that the content is not Heraclitean. Here too the claim is that because the object of the sleepers' understanding is private, they have a private understanding.
39. As is usually the case, Heraclitus gives no reference for pant?n in fr. 114. I take it, then, that "common to all" includes both "common to everything" and 41. These are changes both in the sensory world (roads, the paths of carding wheels, the aging of persons, etc.) and of the sensory world (the turnings of fire, the transformations of the seasons, and so on). On my account, knowledge of the logos leads to an understanding of all of these. For a fuller account of the nature of change in Heraclitus, see Kirk.
42. There is an important textual problem here. Kahn's reading of the fragment, with his suggestion hok? kubern?sai, is consistent with Robinson's reading of hote? ekubern?se. Mackenzie reads the fragment differently, concentrating on what she sees as the fragment's insistence that "everything is distinct" (p. 11); she does not discuss the textual difficulties. The other problem in this fragment is gn?m?: is it to be understood as the plan or purpose by which all things are steered (as in Kahn and Robinson) or as (true) judgment as to how all things are steered (Kirk)? Marcovich (1967 and 1982) 53. The authenticity of the fragment has long been questioned. Kahn doubts that we have Heraclitus' own words, while Robinson says that its textual base is "somewhat flimsy" (p. 148). See Marcovich (1967) , pp. 22-24.
54. See Moravcsik (p. 45); Mackenzie apparently links sense perception with the private (she refers to, but does not discuss, frs. 55 and 101a in her account of the private); see p. 28. It must be noted that Mackenzie argues that Heraclitus recognizes the need for both the private and the common.
Barbaros
here means no more than "non-Greek speaking;" that is, the soul in question is incapable of speaking or understanding the language in which eyes and ears "speak" to it. How can eyes mislead a barbarian soul? The answer is suggested by considering the difficulties of correctly interpreting the gestures of someone whose language one does not speak. Cf. Nussbaum here.
56. As not being immediate we might say that the language of sense perception fails to be common or universal. But this is not the sense of privacy that Moravcsik and (apprently) Mackenzie wish to attribute to sense perception.
57. Moravcsik suggests that perception is private while cognition is common:
perception is apparently "private and incommunicable" while arguments about cognition "can be stated in public" (p. 145). But surely reports of sense perception can be public and common insofar as a common language is spoken, and the par ticular processes of thought and understanding may be just as private as sense perception.
58. Both Kahn (A ) and Robinson take it as having a double sense, while Mackenzie takes it as a reference to the indirect communication of god with man.
59. There were, of course, many layers of interpretation at Delphi. First there are the utterances of the Pythia; then the priest who translates this into hexameters. Then there are the envoys who must interpret the translation. Past experience and in sight are crucial at this stage.
